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CHILD WELFARE’S SCARLET LETTER: HOW A PRIOR 
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS CAN 





In many jurisdictions, once a parent has her rights terminated to one child, 
the State can use that decision to justify the termination of parental rights to 
another child. The State can do so regardless of whether the parent is fit to parent 
the second child. This article explores this practice, examines its origins, and 
discusses its constitutional inadequacies. 
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Generally speaking, the law does not allow courts to decide cases based 
solely on irrebuttable presumptions created by an individual’s past 
transgressions. For example, a defendant in a criminal case cannot be found 
 
 Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the Child Advocacy Law Clinic at the 
University of Michigan Law School. 
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guilty of a new offense simply because she committed crimes in the past.1 In 
fact, generally speaking, evidence of those past crimes is only admissible for 
specific purposes and cannot be used to prove a defendant’s bad character or 
propensity to commit the type of crime at issue.2 Similarly, rules of evidence 
strictly limit the admissibility of past crimes to impeach a witness’s credibility at 
trial, recognizing that an individual’s character can change over time.3 These 
basic recognitions are rooted in the longstanding principle that “in our system of 
jurisprudence, we try cases, rather than persons, and thus a jury may look only to 
the evidence of the events in question, not defendants’ prior acts in reaching its 
verdict.”4 In other words, a prior bad act does not forever render an individual 
guilty of future crimes. 
But child welfare cases—actions in which the State tries to forcibly take 
children from unfit parents and potentially terminate parental rights—are more 
complicated. Predicting whether a parent will harm a child and is therefore unfit 
is an imprecise, subjective task, requiring courts to consider a myriad of factors 
including a parent’s prior acts of abuse, use of drugs, or criminal history. The 
general proposition that a juvenile court must consider a parent’s history as one 
factor in determining whether a parent is unfit is beyond dispute.5 
Even so, the United States Supreme Court has limited the types of 
inferences that the State may rely upon when it seeks to infringe upon the 
fundamental right to parent. For over a century, the Court has recognized the 
sacred, constitutional right of parents to raise their children without unreasonable 
government interference6 and has observed that parents need not be “model 
parents” to retain their parental rights.7 In Stanley v. Illinois, the United States 
 
1. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (proscribing admission of evidence of past crimes to prove 
that a defendant has a propensity for certain crimes and is, therefore, guilty). 
2. Id. But see FED. R. EVID. 414 (allowing prior crimes to be admitted in specific cases for 
any relevant purpose, including a person’s propensity to commit this specific type of crime, in 
child molestation cases). 
3. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (limiting uses for which evidence of past convictions may 
be admitted to attack a witness’s credibility). 
4. People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 499, 504 (Mich. 1988). 
5. See, e.g., In re Adam B., 2016 IL App (1st) 152037, ¶ 48 (“[T]he neglect of one minor is 
admissible as evidence of the neglect of another minor under a parent’s care.”); In re LaFlure, 210 
N.W.2d 482, 489 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (“How a parent treats one child is certainly probative of 
how that parent may treat other children.”). 
6. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (invalidating a grandparent visitation 
statute that did not give deference to the wishes of parents and holding that “it cannot now be 
doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right 
of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children”); Pierce v. 
Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534−35 (1925) (finding that a law prohibiting parents from sending 
children to private schools “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to 
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390, 399, 401 (1923) (striking down a law that prevented parents from choosing that their children 
be taught German, recognizing that liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment 
include the right to “establish a home and bring up children” and “the power of parents to control 
the education of their own” children). 
7. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). 
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Supreme Court circumscribed a juvenile court’s ability to rely on irrebuttable 
presumptions in lieu of determining a parent’s actual unfitness.8 There, the Court 
rejected a statutory scheme that allowed the State to conclusively presume that 
fathers were unfit based solely on the fact that they had failed to marry the 
children’s mothers—making their actual fitness irrelevant.9 The Court 
emphasized that juvenile courts cannot ignore “present realities in deference to 
past formalities.”10 In striking down the law, the Court famously noted that 
“[p]rocedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized 
determination. But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the determinative 
issues of competence and care, . . . it needlessly risks running roughshod over 
the important interests of both parent and child. It therefore cannot stand.”11 
The Stanley Court clearly articulated the constitutional mandate that 
juvenile courts determine the actual fitness of parents prior to intervening in the 
parent-child relationship. Yet unsurprisingly, legislatures have tried to relieve 
courts of this mandate in the guise of protecting children. For example, a 
longstanding practice in some jurisdictions places children in foster care based 
solely on the fitness of one parent, regardless of whether the other parent is 
actually unfit.12 In 2014, the Michigan Supreme Court struck down that practice, 
noting that “[m]erely describing the doctrine foreshadows its constitutional 
weakness.”13 
This article explores another legislative attempt to deny courts of their 
constitutional obligation to adjudicate the actual unfitness of parents. When 
Congress passed the Adoption and Safe Families Act (“ASFA”) in 1997, it 
invited states to violate Stanley’s holding by encouraging them to create 
irrebuttable presumptions of unfitness based solely on a parent’s prior 
termination of parental rights (“TPR”). While ASFA continued to require states 
to make reasonable efforts to reunify a family once it places a child in foster 
care,14 it allowed states to forgo making such efforts when a parent’s rights to 
another child had been terminated in the past—regardless of the circumstances 
of the prior TPR and the parent’s current fitness—and permitted them to proceed 
immediately to terminate that parent’s rights again.15 States embraced this 
invitation and enacted statutes that now authorize courts to find grounds to 
 
8. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
9. Id. at 658. 
10. Id. at 657. 
11. Id. at 656−57. 
12. See Angela Greene, The Crab Fisherman and His Children: A Constitutional Compass 
for the Non-Offending Parent in Child Protection Cases, 24 ALASKA L. REV. 173, 182−89, 198 
(2007); Vivek S. Sankaran, Parens Patriae Run Amuck: The Child Welfare System’s Disregard for 
the Constitutional Rights of Nonoffending Parents, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 63−64 (2009). 
13. In re Sanders, 852 N.W.2d 524, 527 (Mich. 2014). 
14. Adoption and Safe Families Act, 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2012). 
15. See id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii). 
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terminate parental rights based solely on a parent’s prior TPR.16 These statutes 
permit courts to terminate a parent’s rights based on that prior TPR rather than a 
parent’s actual unfitness. For example, if a court in such a jurisdiction terminated 
a parent’s rights two years prior due to the parent’s addiction to drugs, it could 
use that decision to automatically establish grounds to terminate rights to a new 
child regardless of evidence of the parent’s present sobriety. A parent’s past 
actions are conclusively determinative of future conduct. 
Take, for example, the case of J.S.L. v. Jefferson County Department of 
Human Resources, in which the trial court relied upon a parent’s prior TPR to 
terminate parental rights to another child.17 The court issued its decision even 
though there was no evidence that the mother was still using controlled 
substances, engaging in relationships with domestic violence, or lacking the 
ability to care for her children—factors that led to her prior terminations.18 
These facts prompted the children’s guardian ad litem to remark, “[N]o case in 
this [lawyer’s] experience has caused greater angst to the soul of this humble 
lawyer than the case presently before this [c]ourt . . . .”19 But due to the statutory 
framework created by ASFA, the court still terminated the parent’s rights. These 
types of stories are not uncommon to practitioners in the field. 
This article challenges the constitutionality of this practice and argues that 
federal and state statutes must be amended to prohibit the use of irrebuttable 
presumptions in TPR cases. Part II discusses the constitutional floor in TPR 
cases created by Stanley and subsequent United States Supreme Court case law. 
Part III explores how and why Congress invited states to take unconstitutional 
shortcuts when a case involves a parent with a prior TPR and describes how 
states embraced Congress’ request. Part IV examines how courts have responded 
to constitutional challenges to statutes establishing a parent’s unfitness based on 
a prior TPR and demonstrates how many courts have failed to properly interpret 
Stanley’s central holding. Finally, Part V details possible legislative fixes to 
bring statutes in conformity with constitutional mandates and Part VI provides 
concluding remarks. 
 
16. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-319(a)(8) (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2016); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 9-27-341 (2015 & Supp. 2015); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-604(2)(m) (2016); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(a)(6) (2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.806(1)(i) (West Supp. 2011); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 38-2271(a)(1) (Supp. 2016); MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-323(d)(3)(v) (LexisNexis 
2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.19b(3)(l) (West 2012 & Supp. 2016); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
260C.301(b)(4) (West 2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-609(1)(d) (2015) (referencing MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 41-3-423(2)(e) (2015)); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292(2) (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. § 
128.105(1)(b) (2015) (referencing NEV. REV. STAT. § 432B.393(3)(c) (2015)); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 26-8A-26.1(6) (2016); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(M) (West Supp. 2016); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(E) (2015); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-604(b)(7)(C) (LexisNexis 2015 & 
Supp. 2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-309(c)(i) (2015). 
17. J.S.L. v. Jefferson Cty. Dep’t of Human Res., 180 So. 3d 872 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015). 
18. Id. at 880 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
19. Id. at 883. 
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II. 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FLOOR IN TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS CASES 
A. Overview of Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
The right of parents to direct the care, custody, and control of their children 
is an element of liberty protected by due process that is well established under 
the law. Numerous Supreme Court “decisions establish that the Constitution 
protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family 
is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”20 This right protects 
reciprocal interests held by both parents and children. It is “the interest of a 
parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her 
children,”21 and of the children in not being dislocated from the “emotional 
attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association” with the parent.22 
The law’s understanding of the family rests on a belief “that the natural 
bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.”23 
Any legal adjustment of these rights and obligations affects this fundamental 
human relationship, so courts have zealously guarded this relationship from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion, even noting that the fundamental liberty 
interest “does not evaporate simply because [parents] have not been model 
parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.”24 In fact, 
“[e]ven when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in 
preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life.”25 
Three United States Supreme Court cases, Stanley v. Illinois,26 Santosky v. 
Kramer,27 and Quilloin v. Walcott,28 set forth, respectively, three basic 
constitutional requirements before a State can permanently terminate the rights 
of a parent: 1) that the State must prove that a parent is actually unfit; 2) that 
unfitness must be proven by clear and convincing evidence; and 3) that such a 
decision cannot be based solely on a finding that termination would be in the 
child’s best interest. 
As noted above, in Stanley, the Court prevented the State from taking 
children away from their parents absent a finding of actual unfitness.29 The 
 
20. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123−24 (1989) (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“[T]he interest of 
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children [] is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental 
liberty interests recognized by this Court.”). 
21. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). 
22. Smith v. Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977). 
23. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69 (noting the 
“traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her child”). 
24. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). 
25. Id. 
26. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 645. 
27. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 745. 
28. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978). 
29. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658. 
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Court noted that the State registers “no gain towards its declared goals when it 
separates children from the custody of fit parents.”30 As such, although creating 
an irrebuttable presumption of unfitness would always be “cheaper and easier 
than [an] individualized determination[,]” the Court still required the State to 
prove a father’s unfitness prior to stripping him of his right to care for his 
child.31 It recognized that the Constitution has “higher values than speed and 
efficiency.”32 
Next, in Santosky, the Court held that to terminate parental rights, the State 
must prove parental unfitness by at least clear and convincing evidence.33 In 
TPR cases, the State seeks “not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty 
interest, but to end it.”34 The “parent’s interest in the accuracy and justice of the 
decision to terminate his or her parental status is, therefore, a commanding 
one.”35 The Court observed that “until the State proves parental unfitness, the 
child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing [the] erroneous 
termination of their natural relationship.”36 
Finally, in Quilloin, the Court—in a private adoption case—observed that 
the State may not permanently sever the ties between a father and his child based 
solely on a finding that terminating parental rights was in the child’s best 
interest.37 The Court noted, “We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause 
would be offended ‘[i]f a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural 
family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some 
showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in 
the children’s best interest.’”38 This statement is consistent with the Court’s 
observations—on numerous occasions—that “the ‘best interests of the child’ 
standard offers little guidance to judges, and may effectively encourage them to 
rely on their own personal values.”39 For example, in Troxel v. Granville, the 
Court invalidated a visitation statute that permitted a court to infringe upon a 
parent’s rights and order grandparent visitation—over a parent’s objection—
based solely on its finding that visitation would be in the child’s best interest.40 
 
30. Id. at 652. 
31. Id. at 656−57. 
32. Id. at 656. 
33. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768−69 (1982). 
34. Id. at 759. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 760. 
37. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978). 
38. Id. (quoting Smith v. Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 862–63 (1977) 
(Stewart, J., concurring in judgment)). 
39. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 45 n.13 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
40. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72−73 (2000). 
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B. Application of Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
Read together, these decisions demonstrate that the Constitution requires 
that the State prove a parent’s actual unfitness by clear and convincing evidence 
prior to terminating that parent’s rights to her child. Relying on these and other 
decisions, a few appellate courts have struck down TPR statutes that relieved 
courts of their constitutional obligation to determine a parent’s actual unfitness. 
For example, the Kansas Court of Appeals struck down a scheme that permitted 
courts to presume a parent’s unfitness based solely on the fact that a child had 
been out of the home for a year and that the parent had refused to complete the 
court-approved treatment plan.41 The Court of Appeals held that the father was 
constitutionally entitled to a hearing to contest the unfitness presumption prior to 
the court’s finding.42 
Similarly, the Illinois Court of Appeals rejected two statutory provisions 
that allowed courts to automatically find a parent’s unfitness without actually 
assessing that parent’s fitness. In In re S.F., the Court of Appeals struck down a 
provision that conclusively established grounds for termination based on a 
parent’s criminal conviction that resulted from the death of another child due to 
child abuse.43 It found that the automatic presumption denied parents of their 
“right of rebuttal.”44 Similarly, in In re H.G., the Supreme Court of Illinois 
invalidated a statute that presumed a parent’s unfitness if a child had been in 
foster care for fifteen out of the past twenty-two months and the parent failed to 
establish that it was in the child’s best interest to be reunified within six 
months.45 The court observed that the statute “fails to account for the fact that, in 
many cases, the length of a child’s stay in foster care has nothing to do with the 
parent’s ability or inability to safely care for the child”46 and declined to 
recognize that the “State has a compelling interest in removing children from 
foster care in an expeditious fashion when that removal is achieved in an 
unconstitutional manner.”47 These decisions—correctly applying Supreme Court 
jurisprudence—reaffirm that the Constitution does not permit the creation of 
statutes that allow courts to terminate a parent’s rights without first adjudicating 
a parent’s current fitness. 
Yet, unsurprisingly, in times where legislatures perceive the need to address 
a crisis, they may be susceptible to overlooking constitutional doctrine when 
passing laws. This is precisely what happened when Congress passed ASFA and 
encouraged states to terminate a parent’s rights based on a prior termination, 
regardless of the circumstances of the prior termination and the parent’s current 
 
41. In re X.D., 340 P.3d 1230, 1232−34 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014). 
42. Id. at 1232−33. 
43. In re S.F., 834 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
44. Id. 
45. In re H.G., 757 N.E.2d 864, 874 (Ill. 2001). 
46. Id. at 872. 
47. Id. at 874. 
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level of fitness. These developments are detailed in the next section of this 
article. 
III. 
ASFA INVITES STATES TO TERMINATE PARENTAL RIGHTS BASED ON PRIOR 
DECISIONS TO TERMINATE PARENTAL RIGHTS 
A. Enactment of ASFA 
President Clinton signed ASFA into law on November 19, 1997, with wide 
bipartisan support.48 In passing the law, Congress sought to “shift the pendulum 
of the child protection system away from what many saw as an unreasonable 
emphasis on family preservation and towards permanency, and thus health and 
safety, for the children.”49 Congress noted a “growing belief that Federal 
statutes, the social work profession, and the courts sometimes err[ed] on the side 
of protecting the rights of parents” and, supporters of the legislation argued, “[a]s 
a result, too many children [were] subjected to long spells of foster care or 
[were] returned to families that reabuse[d] them.”50 
Specifically, Congress was concerned that the provision in the Adoption 
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 requiring states to make reasonable 
efforts to reunify children with their families had become unreasonable and was 
forcing child welfare agencies to provide services to dangerous parents.51 In 
other words, Congress was concerned that “[s]tates were too focused on efforts 
to return abused and neglected children to their homes, thus endangering 
children in the name of family preservation.”52 Senator Mike DeWine, who 
authored the legislation, proclaimed that providing services to dangerous parents 
was “unnecessary,” “unwise,” and “simply wrong.”53 As such, Congress sought 
to allow states to adjust their practices “to move more efficiently toward 
terminating parental rights and placing children for adoption.”54 
The legislative history details a specific concern shared by various 
stakeholders and legislators about providing services to parents whose rights to 
previous children had been terminated. Sue Badeau, representing the group 
Voices for Adoption, urged Congress to include “termination of parental rights 
of a sibling as one of the exceptions [to the reasonable efforts requirement], with 
 
48. For more information about the events leading up to ASFA, see Katherine Q. Seelye, 
Clinton to Approve Sweeping Shift in Adoption, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 1997), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/17/us/clinton-to-approve-sweeping-shift-in-adoption.html 
[https://perma.cc/64QA-8CCJ]. 
49. Kathleen S. Bean, Aggravated Circumstances, Reasonable Efforts, and ASFA, 29 B.C. 
THIRD WORLD L.J. 223, 224 (2009). 
50. H.R. REP. NO. 105-77, at 8 (1997). 
51. See id. at 7−11. 
52. Bean, supra note 49. 
53. 143 CONG. REC. S12,670 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. DeWine). 
54. H.R. REP. NO. 105-77, at 8 (1997). 
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the provision applying to a parent whose rights have been terminated and who 
will not respond to rehabilitative services and a court finds it unlikely that further 
services would result in reunification.”55 
Professor Richard Gelles, then director of the Family Violence Research 
Program at the University of Rhode Island, supported this view and told 
Congress the story of a child named David,56 a fifteen-month-old boy killed by 
his mother, whose rights to a previous child had been terminated.57 Despite the 
fact that the mother had severely abused a sibling and had failed to benefit from 
services, Gelles stated that the agency had allowed the mother to take David 
home one week after his birth.58 Gelles observed that “the workers when we 
interviewed them said we could not have gotten a court to act on this because we 
had to make reasonable efforts to reunify David with his mother.”59 
Senator DeWine seized on this story and noted that Gelles recommended 
ending “parental rights quickly in cases like David’s in which abusing parents 
have already lost custody of another youngster.”60 Senator DeWine also 
presented a hypothetical that involved a cocaine-addicted mother whose rights to 
seven children had been terminated and who had a new baby born addicted to 
cocaine.61 According to Senator DeWine, case workers, when presented with the 
hypothetical, stated that under the old statutory framework, they would still be 
legally obligated to put the family back together, a result DeWine described as 
favoring “the interests of dangerous and abusive adults over the health and safety 
of children.”62 
Congress also heard examples from Professor Gelles of state laws that 
already permitted states to terminate parental rights based on a parent’s prior 
terminations. Professor Gelles described a Rhode Island law, enacted three years 
prior to ASFA, which allowed courts to consider a prior termination as “prima 
facie evidence for terminating parental rights” to another child.63 Gelles justified 
this law by arguing that it would be better for the system to unnecessarily 
 
55. Child Welfare Reform: Hearing on S. 511, S. 742, and H.R. 867 Before the Subcomm. on 
Social Security and Family Policy of the S. Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong. 40 (1997) (statement 
of Susan Badeau, Rep., Voice for Adoption). 
56. Gelles published a book about David’s story. See generally RICHARD J. GELLES, THE 
BOOK OF DAVID: HOW PRESERVING FAMILIES CAN COST CHILDREN’S LIVES (1996). 
57. Improving the Well-Being of Abused and Neglected Children: Hearing on S. Hrg. 104-
692 Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 104th Cong. 11 (1996) (statement of Richard 
J. Gelles, Director, Family Violence and Research Program) [hereinafter Improving the Well-Being 
of Abused and Neglected Children Hearing]. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. 142 CONG. REC. S80,5713 (daily ed. June 4, 1996) (statement of Sen. DeWine). 
61. Barriers to Adoption: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H. 
Comm. on Ways and Means, 104th Cong. 8 (1996) (statement of Sen. DeWine) [hereinafter 
Barriers to Adoption Hearing]. 
62. Id. 
63. Federal Adoption Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H. 
Comm. on Ways and Means, 104th Cong. 93 (1995). 
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terminate a fit parent’s rights rather than place a child in a potentially dangerous 
home. He challenged Congress: 
 Do you want to make mistakes that ultimately end up in 
children having poor developmental outcomes or even being 
killed, or do you want to take children away, maybe 
inappropriately from parents, maybe a little bit early because the 
system is tilted toward the best interest of the child? It would be 
the latter system I think that we need.64 
Supporting Gelles’ perspective, an official from the Rhode Island Office of 
the Child Advocate argued that it would be “really ridiculous” to have a child 
welfare agency “start all over again in making reasonable efforts” where a parent 
has previously had her parental rights terminated.65 Advocates agreed, 
describing laws in states like Utah66 and California67 that allowed agencies to 
proceed directly to the termination of parental rights stage where parents had 
rights to another child terminated. Together, these advocates and others 
persuaded Congress for the need to act. 
To remedy these perceived problems, Congress passed ASFA and gave 
states wide discretion not to make reasonable efforts to reunify when a parent 
had her rights to another child terminated involuntarily in the past.68 Congress 
allowed states to do this regardless of how long ago the prior TPR had occurred, 
the reasons for the prior TPR, or the current fitness of that parent. In other 
words, Congress permitted states to ignore the circumstances surrounding the 
prior TPR and the steps the parent had taken in the interim to change those 
circumstances. Additionally, Congress invited states to create their own list of 
aggravating circumstances that excused them from making any effort to work 
with a family.69 In short, Congress, responding to the impassioned testimony it 
heard, encouraged states to take shortcuts in cases involving a parent with a prior 
TPR, with the hope of expediting the adoption of children in such cases. 
B. States’ Embrace of ASFA 
States broadly accepted Congress’ invitation. Every state, the District of 
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands enacted laws that allowed them to 
 
64. Id. 
65. Barriers to Adoption Hearing, supra note 61, at 124. 
66. Id. at 78−79 (testimony of Robert Dean, foster parent from Omaha, Nebraska). 
67. Improving the Well-Being of Abused and Neglected Children Hearing, supra note 57, at 
57 (statement of Peter Digre, Director, Dep’t of Children and Family Services, Los Angeles 
County). 
68. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii) (2012). Congress also invited states to forgo reasonable 
efforts where a parent committed murder or voluntary manslaughter of another child of the parent, 
aided or abetted to commit such a murder or voluntary manslaughter, or committed a felony assault 
that resulted in serious bodily injury to the child or another child of the parent. Id. 
69. Id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i). 
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bypass the provision of reasonable efforts where parents had prior TPRs,70 a 
practice that has been upheld by appellate courts examining the issue.71 
Although a few states require the agency to demonstrate that the parent failed to 
remedy the situation that led to the prior TPR, most do not.72 Thus, in most 
jurisdictions, upon the filing of a petition involving a parent with a prior TPR, a 
court can make a finding that the child welfare agency need not make any efforts 
to reunify the family and can proceed immediately to consider the agency’s 
request to terminate the parent’s rights to the child. The agency is relieved of any 
obligation to try to salvage the family unit. 
But many states have gone beyond what Congress specifically encouraged 
and have passed laws permitting courts to actually find grounds to terminate a 
parent’s rights to another child based on the prior TPR.73 Over thirty states have 
done so. These statutes fall into three broad categories. Seventeen states permit 
courts to find grounds to terminate parental rights based solely on that parent’s 
prior TPR.74 In these states, courts can rely exclusively on the prior TPR to find 
grounds to terminate. Courts need not consider any other factors in making this 
finding. In other words, the prior TPR—regardless of how long ago it 
occurred—relieves the State from proving that a parent is currently unfit. 
Approximately ten states allow courts to rely upon a prior TPR but also 
require the State to demonstrate something in addition to the prior TPR.75 For 
 
70. CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, Reasonable Efforts to Preserve or Reunify 
Families and Achieve Permanency for Children 2 (2016), https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/
systemwide/laws-policies/statutes/reunify/ [https://perma.cc/LV6X-BCQT]. 
71. See, e.g., In re Baby Boy H., 63 Cal. App. 4th 470, 478 (1998); In re G.B., 754 N.E.2d 
1027, 1032 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); In re Heather C., 2000 ME 99, ¶¶ 31–32, 751 A.2d 448, 457; In 
re L.N., 2004 SD 126, ¶ 15, 689 N.W.2d 893, 898. 
72. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.086 (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-846 (Supp. 
2016); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5 (West Supp. 2017); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.102 (West 
2014 & Supp. 2017); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.2015 (West 2014 & Supp. 2016). Connecticut 
only allows the state to bypass reasonable efforts for a parent with a prior termination that occurred 
within the past three years. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-111b (West 2016). 
73. In every state, in addition to finding grounds for termination, the court must also find that 
termination is in the child’s best interest, an inherently subjective determination. 
74. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-319(a)(8) (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 
9-27-341 (2015 & Supp. 2015); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-604(2)(m) (2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
13, § 1103(a)(6) (2009); FLA. STAT. Ann. § 39.806(1)(i) (West Supp. 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 
38-2271(a)(1) (Supp. 2016); MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-323(d)(3)(v) (LexisNexis 2012); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.19b(3)(l) (West 2012 & Supp. 2016); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
260C.301(b)(4) (West 2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-609(1)(d) (2015) (referencing MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 41-3-423(2)(e) (2015)); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292(2) (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. § 
128.105(1)(b) (2015) (referencing NEV. REV. STAT. § 432B.393(3)(c) (2015)); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 26-8A-26.1(6) (2016); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(M) (West Supp. 2016); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(E) (2015); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-604(b)(7)(C) (LexisNexis 2015 & 
Supp. 2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-309(c)(i) (2015). 
75. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.086(c)(8); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(b)(1)–(b)(17); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.116(1)(d) (West 2014 & Supp. 2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
625.090(2)(h) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1015(3)(k) (2004 & Supp. 
2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4055 (1-A)(D) (2004 & Supp. 2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 7B-1111(a)(9) (West 2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-4-904(B)(6) (West 2009 & Supp. 
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example, Kentucky requires evidence that the “[t]he conditions or factors which 
were the basis for the previous termination finding have not been corrected.”76 
Arizona, in addition to only allowing courts to consider prior TPRs that occurred 
within the past two years, also requires proof that the parent is “currently unable 
to discharge parental responsibilities due to the same cause.”77 North Carolina 
requires a finding that “the parent lacks the ability or willingness to establish a 
safe home.”78 In these jurisdictions, courts might consider—among other 
factors—the circumstances of the prior TPR, how long ago it occurred, and the 
parents’ efforts to remedy past neglect. 
Finally, a small number of jurisdictions permit courts to base a TPR on a 
prior TPR but limit this application to prior TPRs that occurred within a specific 
time period. For example, in Connecticut, Missouri, and Wisconsin, courts may 
only rely upon prior TPRs that occurred within three years of the current 
action.79 So while these jurisdictions do not require the State to prove that a 
parent is currently unfit, they do establish some time limits on how long a 
parent’s prior TPR can be used as a proxy for continued unfitness. 
Unsurprisingly, lawyers have challenged these statutory schemes by directly 
appealing TPR decisions on the grounds that they violate the fundamental 
principles of Stanley, Santosky, and other Supreme Court cases. But while 
lawyers have succeeded in a few of these cases, most have failed. The next 
section details challenges to these statutes and explains why courts affirming 
these statutes have erred. 
IV. 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO PRIOR TPR STATUTES 
Lawyers challenging the constitutionality of prior TPR statutes have relied 
upon Stanley to frame their arguments. Prior TPR statutes violate Stanley by 
relieving courts of their constitutional obligation to determine whether a parent is 
actually unfit prior to stripping her—permanently—of her right to care for her 
child. In doing so, the statutes create an irrebuttable presumption of unfitness, 
which is exactly the type of practice that Stanley condemns.
80
 As the United 
States Supreme Court unequivocally decreed in Vlandis v. Kline, “[A] statute 
creating a presumption which operates to deny a fair opportunity to rebut it 




2017); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.502(6) (2015); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(a)(2)(iv) (2013 & Supp. 
2016). 
76. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090(2)(h) (LexisNexis 2014). 
77. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533(B)(10) (2014 & Supp. 2016). 
78. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-1111(a)(9). 
79. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-111b(b) (West 2016); MO. REV. STAT. § 211.447(5)(6)(b) 
(West Supp. 2017); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.415(10)(b) (West 2011 & Supp. 2016). 
80. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972). 
81. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973) (quoting Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 329 
(1932)). 
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A. Some Courts Have Invalidated Prior TPR Statutes 
A few appellate courts have embraced this argument. The Florida Supreme 
Court, in Florida Department of Children & Families v. F.L.,82 interpreted 
Florida’s prior TPR statute to require the State to prove, in addition to the prior 
termination of parental rights, that there is a “substantial risk of harm to the 
current child.”83 While the court noted that “the circumstances leading to the 
prior involuntary termination” would be highly relevant to the court’s 
determination of whether the current child is at risk,84 it also explained that 
“[w]hile a parent’s past conduct necessarily has some predictive value as to that 
parent’s likely future conduct, positive life changes can overcome a negative 
history.”85 It therefore provided the following instructions to trial courts: 
[I]f the parent’s conduct that led to the involuntary termination 
involved egregious abuse or neglect of another child, this will 
tend to indicate a greater risk of harm to the current child. The 
amount of time that has passed since the prior involuntary 
termination will also be relevant. A very recent involuntary 
termination will tend to indicate a greater current risk. Finally, 
evidence of any change in circumstances since the prior 
involuntary termination will obviously be significant to a 
determination of risk to a current child.86 
The Michigan Court of Appeals reached a similar outcome in In re Gach.87 
There, the court struck down a statute that allowed trial courts to presume 
parental unfitness for parents with prior TPRs, requiring that the decision, 
instead, be based on the child’s best interests, as established by clear and 
convincing evidence.88 In finding this practice “constitutionally deficient[,]”89 
the court found that the statute failed to require courts to find, by clear and 
convincing evidence, “that the parent had failed to remedy the earlier abuse or 
negligence that led to the earlier termination.”90 In the court’s eyes, this was a 
fatal defect. 
The Kansas Court of Appeals, in In re J.L., embraced a similar argument.91 
There, the State based its entire case on the fact that a parent’s rights to her 
children had been terminated eight years prior to the current case.92 The Court of 
 
82. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602, 607 (Fla. 2004). 
83. Id. at 609. 
84. Id. at 610. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. In re Gach, 2016 Mich. App. LEXIS 783 (Apr. 19, 2016). 
88. Id. at *18−19. 
89. Id. at *16. 
90. Id. at *18−19. 
91. In re J.L., 891 P.2d 1125 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995). 
92. Id. at 1127. 
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Appeals observed that permitting the State to terminate the parent-child 
relationship “by relying on a journal entry filed in an eight-year-old termination 
procedure makes the process much too easy on the part of the government.”93 It 
noted its disbelief that “presumptions derived from eight-year-old lawsuits 
should shift the burden of proof in parental termination cases”94 and concluded 
that the net result of these statutes is an “unacceptable risk that a parent judged 
unfit many years ago will erroneously be adjudged unfit today for no other 
reason than a presumption based on the result in a case which has become 
irrelevant.”95 To remedy the unconstitutional statute, the court instructed trial 
courts to consider additional factors, including the passage of time, whether the 
facts in the current case resembled those from the past, and whether the cases 
involved the same children.96 Employing this reasoning, the Supreme Court of 
Rhode Island, in interpreting its statute to prohibit terminations based solely on 
past TPRs, observed that “[p]ast actions are not sufficient to brand a parent unfit 
for life.”97 
B. Many Courts Have Refused to Invalidate Prior TPR Statutes 
In contrast to these decisions, other courts have refused to invalidate prior 
TPR statutes, citing a variety of differing, but equally unpersuasive, rationales. 
Some courts have simply stated that a prior TPR is evidence of a parent’s 
continuing and permanent unfitness, an argument that contravenes the legal 
system’s recognition that an individual’s guilt cannot be defined solely based on 
prior findings. A Minnesota court noted that “[a] parent who has had his or her 
parental rights involuntarily terminated has been adjudicated as posing a threat to 
the child now and into the future.”98 One in New Mexico found that “in most of 
the reported cases, there is a very real relationship between the past conduct and 
the current abilities.”99 A third from California concluded, “Experience has 
shown that with certain parents . . . the risk of recidivism is a very real 
concern. Therefore, when another child of that same parent is adjudged a 
dependent child, it is not unreasonable to assume [that future parenting] efforts 
will be unsuccessful.”100 
The reasoning in these cases flatly contradicts Stanley, which barred courts 
from relying on irrebuttable presumptions to find a parent to be currently unfit 
based solely on past conduct.101 But independent of the legal analysis, the logic 
 
93. Id. at 1130. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 1131. 
96. Id. at 1136. 
97. In re Kelly S., 715 A.2d 1283, 1287 (R.I. 1998). 
98. In re Child of P.T. & A.T., 657 N.W.2d 577, 588 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). 
99. State ex rel. Children Youth & Families Dep’t v. Amy B., 61 P.3d 845, 850 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 2002). 
100. In re Baby Boy H., 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 793, 799 (Ct. App. 1998). 
101. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656−57 (1972). 
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is nonsensical. To suggest that a parent whose rights were terminated ten years 
ago due to a toxic domestic violence relationship will therefore remain unfit 
forever—regardless of the choices she has made in the interim—ignores the 
reality that people are capable of changing.102 Even state legislatures have 
recognized this. At least nine states now permit the reinstatement of parental 
rights after a court terminates the rights of the parent, allowing children to return 
home to parents previously found to be unfit.103 These statutes reflect the reality 
that the ability of parents to care for children can—and does—change. 
Other courts have upheld the constitutionality of prior TPR statutes, 
suggesting that Stanley only required courts to give parents notice and an 
opportunity to be heard.104 Thus, as long as courts give parents the ability to 
appear and present their case, their constitutional rights are not disturbed. But 
this reasoning reflects a complete misunderstanding of Stanley. While Stanley 
did discuss the father’s opportunity to be heard, its central holding required the 
State to prove the father’s current unfitness prior to removing his child from his 
custody.105 Thus, Stanley announced that demonstrating the father’s unfitness 
was a substantive burden shouldered by the State prior to placing a child in 
foster care.106 Simply providing parents with notice and an opportunity to be 
heard cannot satisfy this constitutional burden. 
Courts in Wisconsin have taken a more creative approach—they have 
upheld their prior TPR statute by applying a theory based on the interconnected 
nature of decisions made by the juvenile court prior to the TPR hearing.107 These 
 
102. See, e.g., In re Gach, 2016 Mich. App. LEXIS 783, at *18−19 (Apr. 19, 2016) 
(reversing TPR where the mother’s prior TPR was based on her involvement in a domestic 
violence relationship she was no longer in). 
103. For more information about reinstatement of parental rights statutes, see Reinstatement 
of Parental Rights State Statute Summary, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 21, 2016), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/reinstatement-of-parental-rights-state-statute-sum.as
px#Statutory Charr [https://perma.cc/A3YL-SBEL]. 
104. See, e.g., In re T.S.B., 2008 MT 23, ¶ 38, 341 Mont. 204, 177 P.3d 429; In re A.P., 2007 
MT 297, ¶ 22, 340 Mont. 39, 172 P.3d 105; In re W.L.P., 678 N.W.2d 703, 713 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2004). 
105. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649 (“[A]s a matter of due process of law, Stanley was entitled to a 
hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him . . . .”). 
106. Id. 
107. See, e.g., Dane Cty. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. P.P. (In re Diana P.), 2005 WI App 32, ¶ 
32, 279 Wis. 2d 169, 694 N.W.2d 344 (“The findings that are required for a court to proceed 
against a parent at each of the steps prior to the final step . . . involve an evaluation of a parent’s 
fitness. It is the cumulative effect of the determinations made at each of the previous steps that 
causes the findings made under [the statute] to amount to unfitness.”); Oneida Cty. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs. v. Nicole W. (In re Tatiana A.W.), 2009 WI App 56U, ¶ 11–12, 317 Wis. 2d 64, 768 
N.W.2d 64 (finding that requirements for a showing of abandonment, abuse, or neglect and for a 
termination of parental rights to another child within the prior three years “ensure[] courts will 
have made specific findings reflecting the parent’s fitness over a short span of time before the 
parent’s rights can be terminated”); Brown Cty. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Ivan L.-C. (In re 
Ivannies L.), 2008 WI App 36U, ¶ 12, 308 Wis. 2d 397, 74 N.W.2d 606 (citing In re Diana P., 
2005 WI App 32, ¶ 32); State v. Lawana R. (In re Damone R.), 2007 WI App 230U, ¶ 13, 306 
Wis. 2d 126, 740 N.W.2d 902 (same). 
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courts have found the statute to be narrowly tailored because the series of 
decisions prior to the TPR decision—the initial removal order, the adjudication 
decision, and the dispositional judgments—ensure that only the rights of unfit 
parents are terminated. As one court described, “This series of steps acts as a 
funnel, making smaller and smaller the groups of parents whose relationships 
with their children are affected at each step . . . .”108 Another noted that Stanley, 
while requiring unfitness findings, did not require these findings to occur at one 
particular stage.109 Thus, according to these courts, the series of interim findings 
can satisfy the constitutionally required unfitness determination. 
This reasoning, however, has two principal flaws. First, prior to terminating 
a parent’s rights, due process requires that a parent’s unfitness be proven by clear 
and convincing evidence.110 But many of the interim decisions that occur in the 
child protective process require far lower standards of proof. For example, a 
child can be removed from her home under a probable cause standard.111 Many 
states permit courts to adjudicate a claim related to a child if there is a 
preponderance of evidence demonstrating abuse or neglect.112 Similarly, courts 
making decisions at the dispositional stage, involving whether a child should 
visit her parent or return home, apply a lower—and often undefined—
standard.113 Relying on a series of interim findings that apply lower standards of 
proof does not satisfy the constitutional mandate that unfitness be proven by 
clear and convincing evidence. 
 
108. In re Diana P., 2005 WI App 32, at ¶ 32. 
109. In re Damone R., 2007 WI App 230U, at ¶ 14. 
110. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (holding that a clear and convincing 
evidence standard “adequately conveys to the factfinder the level of subjective certainty about his 
factual conclusions necessary to satisfy due process”). 
111. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.205(1)(a) (West 2011 & 2016 Supp.). 
112. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.011 (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-844 (2014 & Supp. 
2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-325(h)(2)(B) (2015 & Supp. 2015); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 
355 & 355.1 (West 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-505(1) (2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-
129 (West Supp. 2016); D.C. CODE § 16-2317(b)(2) (2001–2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.507(1)(b) 
(West 2010); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 587A-4 (West Supp. 2016); IDAHO CODE § 16-1619(4) (2009 & 
Supp. 2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.100(3) (LexisNexis 2014); LA. CH. CODE art. 665 (2004 
& Supp. 2009); ME REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4035(2) (2004 & Supp. 2016); MD. CTS & JUD. 
PROC. § 3-817(c) (LexisNexis 2013); MICH. CT. R. § 3.972(C)(1); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-
561(3) (West 2008 & Supp. 2013; MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-422(5)(a) (2015); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 169-C:13 (LexisNexis 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.46(b) (West 2013); N.Y. FAM. CT. 
ACT § 1046(b) (Consol. Supp. 2016); OKL. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, §§ 1-4-602 & 1-4-603 (West 
2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.310(3) (2015); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 447h (2014); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 63-7-1660(A) (2010 & Supp. 2016); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.005 (West 2014 & Supp. 
2016); VER. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5315(a) (2014 & Supp. 2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-252(G) 
(2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.130 (West 2013 & Supp. 2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-
425(a) (2015). 
113. Most state statutes do not define the standard of proof for court decisions made at the 
dispositional stage before a TPR hearing. 
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Second, the legal standard for these interim decisions does not require the 
courts to actually find a parent to be unfit.114 Justice Abramson of the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court discussed this concern extensively in her dissent in In re Diana 
P. She wrote: 
 The problem with this statutory scheme is that the grounds 
for denying visitation or placement are not based on the unfitness 
of the parent, but are instead based upon the best interests of the 
child. No finding or evidence of unfitness is required for these 
visitation decisions. This becomes important because there may 
be reasons the court did not modify the order denying placement 
and visitation, including serious illness, temporary incarceration 
or involuntary absence from the jurisdiction, or a judge’s illness 
or death, that have little or nothing to do with the unfitness of a 
parent. 
 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.13 provides the grounds that need to 
be established to show that a child is in need of protection or 
services. Again, the court views these grounds with the focus on 
the best interest of the child. Assessing parental unfitness is 
irrelevant. . . . The long and the short of it is that a parent may 
ultimately be found to be unfit even though the parent’s reasons 
for losing visitation and/or placement of one’s child has nothing 
to do with whether that parent is unfit. All that need be shown is 
that a parent lost placement or visitation and failed to meet the 
conditions necessary for reinstating that placement or 
visitation.115 
Taken together, relying on interim decisions that apply a lower standard of 
proof and do not assess a parent’s unfitness cannot satisfy the constitutional test 
that a parent’s unfitness be proven by clear and convincing evidence prior to 
terminating that parent’s rights. 
Finally, a few courts have upheld prior TPR statutes by noting that the 
government still bears the burden of clear and convincing evidence at the best 
interest stage of the TPR hearing, irrespective of findings or statutory 
presumptions of parental unfitness.116 In every jurisdiction across the country, 
after a court finds that there are statutory grounds to terminate a parent’s rights, 
the parent still has the ability to demonstrate why TPR is contrary to the child’s 
 
114. See Dane Cty. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. P.P. (In re Diana P.), 2005 WI App 32, ¶ 28, 
694 N.W.2d 344 (2005) (acknowledging that not every ground in the removal statute goes to a 
parent’s fitness). 
115. Id. at 365 (Abramson, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
116. See, e.g., In re R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 137 (Minn. 2014) (noting that neither a finding 
of unfitness nor a finding of the best interests of a child alone is enough to warrant involuntary 
termination of parental rights); In re K.W., 925 N.E.2d 181, at ¶ 2 (upholding grant of permanent 
custody to child services agency where the parent’s other children had also been removed and 
where the best interests of the child were demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence). 
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best interests. According to these courts, during the best interest stage, the 
parents have a right to present evidence that their circumstances have changed 
and that they are currently fit, which the court must consider. Thus, the statutes 
pass constitutional muster. 
This argument misunderstands the burdens placed on a court by Stanley and 
Santosky. Stanley and Santosky require the court, prior to terminating a parent’s 
rights, to hold a hearing on parental fitness and to find that a parent is unfit by 
clear and convincing evidence.117 When considering the child’s best interests, 
however, a court need not make a finding that a parent is unfit. Rather, the best 
interest finding is a vague, subjective standard that permits the court to consider 
a limitless range of factors, including the advantages of the child remaining in 
her foster home, to determine what it believes is best for the child.118 It does not 
require the court to assess a parent’s fitness. Additionally, when considering best 
interest factors, the court, in some jurisdictions, need only find by a 
preponderance of evidence—and not clear and convincing evidence—that TPR 
is in the child’s best interest.119 
In Stanley, the Supreme Court was presented with, and rejected, a similar 
argument. There, the State of Illinois argued that even though its statutory 
scheme presumed unwed fathers to be unfit without establishing unfitness in 
fact, the father nonetheless retained the ability to regain custody through other 
proceedings.120 The court summarily dismissed this argument, explicitly stating 
that treating parents as presumptively unfit, legal strangers to their children and 
then asking them to prove why it would be in their children’s best interest to 
have custody violated the Constitution.121 In short, simply giving parents the 
opportunity to present evidence related to a child’s best interest is very different 
than the constitutional mandate that the State must demonstrate a parent’s 
current unfitness by clear and convincing evidence. To equate these two 
standards would eviscerate the holdings of Stanley, Santosky, and Quilloin. 
As described above, state statutes that permit courts to find grounds to 
terminate a parent’s rights based solely on a parent’s prior TPR violate the 
 
117. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (holding that due process requires 
parental unfitness to be demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 
U.S. 345, 658 (1972) (holding that reliance on a presumption of parental unfitness for unwed 
fathers is impermissible under equal protection where other parents are guaranteed a hearing). 
118. See, e.g., In re Foster, 776 N.W.2d 415, 418 (Mich. 2009) (allowing courts to consider 
the advantages of the foster home in best interests determination); In re K.W., 925 N.E.2d at ¶ 20 
(noting that the court may consider factors other than parental fitness including “(1) the interaction 
and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, [or] foster caregivers, 
. . . (2) the wishes of the child, . . . (3) the custodial history of the child, . . . [and] (4) the child’s 
need for a legally secure placement”). 
119. See, e.g., In re Moss, 836 N.W.2d 182, 187 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that best 
interests need only be proven by a preponderance of evidence); B.J.H. v. B.J.H. (In re B.J.H.), 356 
S.W.2d 816, 835 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (same). 
120. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 647 (rejecting adoption or guardianship proceedings as suitable 
alternatives). 
121. Id. at 648−49. 
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constitutional rights of those parents. The next section proposes a slight, but 
substantive, change to federal and state child welfare statutes to fix this 
constitutional problem. 
V. 
A LEGISLATIVE FIX 
As the Court noted in Stanley, while the State has an interest in separating 
children from dangerous parents, it “registers no gain towards its declared goals 
when it separates children from the custody of fit parents.”122 In fact, it “spites 
its own articulated goals when it needlessly separates” fit parents from their 
family.123 Thus, federal and state statutes must be narrowly tailored to ensure 
that the State permanently separates children from only truly unfit parents. 
When cases involve a parent whose rights have been previously terminated, 
statutes should instruct courts to carefully consider the parent’s prior 
termination. To ensure that the State does not unnecessarily terminate the rights 
of fit parents, those statutes should also require the State to demonstrate—by 
clear and convincing evidence—that the conditions that led to the prior 
termination continue to exist. A number of state statutes provide examples of 
how this might be done. For example, in Kentucky, a court must find that “the 
conditions or factors which were the basis for the previous termination finding 
have not been corrected.”124 In Iowa, a court must conclude that “[s]ubsequent 
to the child in need of assistance adjudication, the parents were offered or 
received services to correct the circumstance which led to the adjudication, and 
the circumstance continues to exist despite the offer or receipt of services.”125 
And in Oregon, a court must determine whether “the conditions giving rise to the 
previous action have not been ameliorated.”126 These statutes require the State to 
demonstrate that a parent has not remedied the conditions that led to the prior 
determination of her unfitness. 
As described in Part III, many state statutes do not do this. Some allow 
courts to create irrebuttable presumptions of unfitness based solely on a parent’s 
prior TPR regardless of her current fitness.127 Others allow irrebuttable 
presumptions, but limit the use of the prior decisions to TPRs that occurred 
within a specific time period.128 And a small subset of states provide some 
limiting language on how courts can use prior TPRs, but still fail to provide clear 
instructions to courts in assessing whether the conditions leading to the previous 
 
122. Id. at 652. 
123. Id. at 653. 
124. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090(2)(h)(3) (LexisNexis 2014). 
125. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.116(1)(d)(2) (West 2014 & 2016 Supp.). 
126. OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.502(6) (2015). 
127. See state statutes cited supra note 74. 
128. See state statutes cited supra note 79. 
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termination continue to exist.129 For example, Maine places the burden on the 
parent to demonstrate that she has the “ability or willingness” to show the court 
that she has sought services on her own or could benefit from future services.130 
This level of ambiguity invites constitutional violations, especially when the 
burden is placed on the parent to make such an undefined showing. 
The federal government can guide states on this issue by amending ASFA to 
make clear that states must make reasonable efforts to reunify children with fit 
parents. It can do so by requiring reasonable efforts to reunify even when parents 
have a prior termination unless there is evidence that the parent has failed to 
remedy the conditions that led to the prior termination. The current statute does 
not contain this limiting language.131 As a result, the government’s invitation for 
states to bypass reasonable efforts at reunification for any parent with a prior 
termination increases the risk that a state will terminate the parental rights of a fit 
parent who successfully addressed the issues that led to the prior TPR. As 
recognized by the Supreme Court, the State spites its own goals when it 
terminates the rights of currently fit parents.132 By making these small, but 
substantive, tweaks to state and federal statutes, legislatures can achieve the 
proper balance between protecting children and preserving the important 
relationships children have with fit parents. 
Until these changes occur, advocates representing parents and children 
should continue to challenge the constitutionality of current statutes. Where a 
parent has remedied the conditions that led to a previous termination, they must 
demand that the State make reasonable efforts to keep the family together.133 
They must require the State to demonstrate that a parent is currently unfit and 
not allow it to prove its case by relying solely on evidence of the parent’s past 
conduct. And they must be diligent in preserving these constitutional challenges 
at the trial court level so that appellate courts—like those in Florida, Michigan, 
and Kansas134—can have the opportunity to invalidate unconstitutional statutes. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
Unless states amend their current statutes, a strong possibility exists that 
courts will terminate the rights of fit parents based solely on their past 
 
129. See state statutes cited supra note 75. 
130. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4055 (1-A)(D) (2004 & Supp. 2016). 
131. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii) (2012) (providing that states are not obligated to make 
reasonable efforts to preserve or reunify families when “the parental rights of the parent to a 
sibling have been terminated involuntarily”). 
132. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 653 (1972). 
133. See infra Part IV.A. (discussing cases from Florida, Kansas, and Michigan in which 
appellate courts have required the State to show that the parent did not remedy the conditions that 
led to the prior TPR). 
134. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602, 607 (Fla. 2004); In re Gach, 
2016 Mich. App. LEXIS 783 (Apr. 19, 2016); In re J.L., 891 P.2d 1125, 1125 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1995). 
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transgressions. Not only does this practice violate the Constitution, but it also 
undermines the State’s interest in keeping children with fit parents. Courts must 
be vigilant in protecting the constitutional rights of parents in these cases, and 
federal and state legislatures should amend current statutes to prevent this from 
happening. Small, but substantive, legislative changes can ensure the protection 
of important rights. Until then, advocates must be diligent in protecting the rights 
of parents. 
